In How the World Became Rich, Mark Koyama and Jared Rubin have produced what I think will become a beloved economic history classic, like Power and Plenty or The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective from over a decade ago. I fawn over a refreshingly readable book and raise a couple of concerns about the thesis:
Thank you Davis. I’m here from Marginal Revolution, and this post has been a joy to read. I look forward to my copy of the book arriving and to your next post here!
This was a great and informative review! Just a comment re: the Rodrik/IP/developmental state stuff. I think generally an issue I have with a lot of economic history that stresses the criticality of constrained governance is that "constrainment" is acknowledged without a matching emphasis on strong decisive governance (the so-called "state capacity"). For an example, a lot of the Dutch Republic's power came from its constrained governance of course, but this constrained governance allowed its state to expand its capabilities (Marjolein 't Hart has a lot of good work on this topic). It just seems like ignoring or placing the state as the antagonist of economic growth seems to be the source of K&R's dismissal of Soviet growth, skepticism of the the East Asian Tiger's IP or the uncritical embracing of Indian liberalization in the 90s. There's good work in poly sci (Mark Dincecco and Yuhua Wang) who I feel do a good job of matching constrained governance with state strength in a more cohesive story, and I'd like to see more work connecting this to economic growth. I think there must be some continuity between this statist skepticism and embracement of the Glorious Revolution as causal rather than symptomatic of growth, right?
I am surprised to hear that institutions are a strength of Koyama and Rubin, because, like you, I found their discussions of institutions deeply unsatisfactory.
I confess I have read only the first half of the book so far, and I understand the limitations of a book of this sort and length, but I found their assertions about "institutions" to be vague, ahistorical, and full of lacunae. Which institutions exactly, in which regions? In which periods? (It's nonsensical to talk about "the Netherlands" before the 19th century, for instance.) Assuming them to be unchanging and classifying them as "helpful" or "unhelpful" is not the approach I would expect from a senior researcher.
They, or you, might respond that I am seemingly asking them to undertake several history degrees' worth of study of various regions around the world. Yes, I am. Children's stories are unlikely to lead to solid understanding.
Similarly, summarily dismissing the role of coal because "China had coal" demonstrates superficial understanding at best. China has thermal coal, Britain had ample easily accessible coking coal. The difference is very important: you can't make good quality metals without coking coal.
This century we are undertaking several "natural" (uncontrolled) experiments that may help clarify the roles of demographics, energy, institutions / state capacity, culture and human capital, and geography/climate/resources. I look forward to seeing the state of the discussion in the 2050s.
Thank you Davis. I’m here from Marginal Revolution, and this post has been a joy to read. I look forward to my copy of the book arriving and to your next post here!
This was a great and informative review! Just a comment re: the Rodrik/IP/developmental state stuff. I think generally an issue I have with a lot of economic history that stresses the criticality of constrained governance is that "constrainment" is acknowledged without a matching emphasis on strong decisive governance (the so-called "state capacity"). For an example, a lot of the Dutch Republic's power came from its constrained governance of course, but this constrained governance allowed its state to expand its capabilities (Marjolein 't Hart has a lot of good work on this topic). It just seems like ignoring or placing the state as the antagonist of economic growth seems to be the source of K&R's dismissal of Soviet growth, skepticism of the the East Asian Tiger's IP or the uncritical embracing of Indian liberalization in the 90s. There's good work in poly sci (Mark Dincecco and Yuhua Wang) who I feel do a good job of matching constrained governance with state strength in a more cohesive story, and I'd like to see more work connecting this to economic growth. I think there must be some continuity between this statist skepticism and embracement of the Glorious Revolution as causal rather than symptomatic of growth, right?
I am surprised to hear that institutions are a strength of Koyama and Rubin, because, like you, I found their discussions of institutions deeply unsatisfactory.
I confess I have read only the first half of the book so far, and I understand the limitations of a book of this sort and length, but I found their assertions about "institutions" to be vague, ahistorical, and full of lacunae. Which institutions exactly, in which regions? In which periods? (It's nonsensical to talk about "the Netherlands" before the 19th century, for instance.) Assuming them to be unchanging and classifying them as "helpful" or "unhelpful" is not the approach I would expect from a senior researcher.
They, or you, might respond that I am seemingly asking them to undertake several history degrees' worth of study of various regions around the world. Yes, I am. Children's stories are unlikely to lead to solid understanding.
Similarly, summarily dismissing the role of coal because "China had coal" demonstrates superficial understanding at best. China has thermal coal, Britain had ample easily accessible coking coal. The difference is very important: you can't make good quality metals without coking coal.
This century we are undertaking several "natural" (uncontrolled) experiments that may help clarify the roles of demographics, energy, institutions / state capacity, culture and human capital, and geography/climate/resources. I look forward to seeing the state of the discussion in the 2050s.
Very nice review. Thank you.