Good piece. Any thoughts on Pincus's view of 1688? He basically concedes that William's ascension didn't do much for property rights or interest rates, but argues it shifted equilibrium political power toward pro-war Whigs and manufacturing interests, resulting in pro-growth policies like the Bank of England and infrastructure investment
Thanks! I'm not a Pincus fan, but I find his explanation at least partially plausible. However, I don't think that Hanoverian England pursued "pro-growth" policies *of consequence*—big-ticket spending items were foreign policy, and infrastructure investment was inadequate. I am favorable to the Mokyr/Nye distributional coalitions argument, though, and Pincus aligns with this in some ways. The effect comes through declining rent-seeking.
Good piece. Any thoughts on Pincus's view of 1688? He basically concedes that William's ascension didn't do much for property rights or interest rates, but argues it shifted equilibrium political power toward pro-war Whigs and manufacturing interests, resulting in pro-growth policies like the Bank of England and infrastructure investment
Thanks! I'm not a Pincus fan, but I find his explanation at least partially plausible. However, I don't think that Hanoverian England pursued "pro-growth" policies *of consequence*—big-ticket spending items were foreign policy, and infrastructure investment was inadequate. I am favorable to the Mokyr/Nye distributional coalitions argument, though, and Pincus aligns with this in some ways. The effect comes through declining rent-seeking.
On North and Weingast, check out:
Clark (1996): "The political foundations of modern economic growth: England, 1540-1800"
Stasavage (2002): "Credible commitment in early modern Europe: North and Weingast revisited"
Sussman and Yafeh (2006): "Institutional reforms, financial development and sovereign debt: Britain 1690–1790"
On institutions/WNF in general:
Ogilvie and Carus (2014): "Institutions and economic growth in historical perspective"
Thanks!